Su Shi's Xuzhou Flood Control from the Perspective of Systems Methodology

Note: This article originated from a major assignment for the course “Research Methods in Systems Engineering.” The initial requirement was to write a report combining research direction and course content. Later, the restriction on research direction was lifted, leading to this impromptu article.

Introduction

Xuzhou has a recorded history of over four hundred floods (References 1, 2). Flood control and disaster relief have been frequently carried out. However, local people are well aware that in this ancient river channel, Su Shi, a famous writer and historical figure in flood control from the Northern Song Dynasty, made diligent efforts that benefited generations. This is why the saying “Su Dyke and Yellow Tower” exists (In 1077 AD, Su Shi led soldiers and civilians to build a large dyke in the southeast of Xuzhou city to resist floods. Local people called it “Su Dyke” in memory of Su Shi. After resolving the Xuzhou flood disaster, Su Shi built a yellow-earthed tower at the east gate of the city, symbolizing “earth conquering water” to suppress floods and commemorate the victory over the disaster). As the couplet on the main entrance of the Yellow Tower says, “Lakes and mountains sing the Yellow Tower賦, heaven and earth cherish Su Zi’s merit.” Flood control itself involves numerous factors and requires coordination between central and local authorities, human and material resources, weather, and terrain, thus falling within the scope of systems engineering. This article, as an assignment report for “Research Methods in Systems Engineering,” will analyze the physical, managerial, and human aspects of Su Shi’s Xuzhou flood control in 1077 AD from the perspective of systems methodology, showcasing the “engineer” side of the ancient scholar Su Shi.

Flood Control Process and Analysis

According to existing historical documents (such as “Xuzhou Fu Zhi,” “Song Shi,” “Jiang Yu Chi Ji,” and “Huang Lou Fu”), the surviving details of Su Shi’s Xuzhou flood control in 1077 AD (Xining Decade) are mainly divided into four events: first, stabilizing public morale; second, repairing and strengthening city defenses in advance; third, conscripting troops before the disaster; and fourth, building a large dyke after the disaster. This section will analyze these four events sequentially from the perspective of systems methodology. The systems methodology referred to in this article specifically pertains to the “Physics-Management-Humanity” (WSR) methodology taught in the course, proposed by Chinese scholar Gu Jifa. Some argue that this methodology “demonstrates its uniqueness when observing and analyzing systems with complex characteristics and possesses traditional Chinese philosophical speculation,” with “understanding physics, clarifying management, and comprehending humanity” as its practical guidelines (Reference 3). Therefore, physics, management, and humanity are the key aspects for analyzing Su Shi’s flood control process.

Stabilizing Public Morale First

The river breached at Cao Village, flooded Liangshan Marsh, overflowed into the South Qing River, and converged at the city wall. The water rose continuously and could not be drained, threatening to destroy the city. Wealthy citizens scrambled to evacuate. Shi said, “If the wealthy leave, the people will panic. Who will I defend the city with? As long as I am here, the water will not destroy the city.” He then ordered them back into the city. (Song Shi·Su Shi Liezhuan)

Historical records indicate that the Yellow River breached at Cao Village, flooding Liangshan Marsh, overflowing into the South Qing River, and converging at the walls of Xuzhou. If the rising water was not promptly drained, the city walls would be compromised. Wealthy citizens were scrambling to flee the city to escape the flood. The phrases “converged at the city wall,” “city threatening to collapse,” and “wealthy citizens scrambling to evacuate” show that as the crisis neared, there were already signs of public disobedience and desertion in Xuzhou. Faced with the flood, the common responses were to abandon or defend the city. Abandoning the city meant losing all property and having to consider the speed of evacuation, relocation sites, and subsequent famine and plague. Defending the city involved raising the city walls and plugging breaches, but manpower was limited, and once the city was besieged by floodwaters, the population would be completely trapped. Given the technological level of the Song Dynasty, it is presumed that people at that time could not accurately predict the water level and had no absolute certainty of successfully defending Xuzhou. Su Shi, as the leader, chose to defend the city, which required him to mobilize all available manpower and resources to strengthen the city defenses as much as possible. However, the wealthy, perhaps due to distrust of the government or prioritizing their private interests, were the first to abandon the city. In response, Su Shi believed that if the wealthy fled Xuzhou, it would lead to a complete loss of control over the city’s populace, significantly reducing the manpower available for defense. Therefore, Su Shi showed a willingness to share weal and woe with the fleeing wealthy, guaranteeing with his own life that Xuzhou would not fall. On the one hand, Su Shi understood the need to promptly suppress any signs of potential loss of control within a group; on the other hand, Su Shi knew how to appease public sentiment in a crisis. Both of these points stem from common human understanding and reflect Su Shi’s insight into and handling of “humanity.”

Repairing and Strengthening City Defenses in Advance

Six sluice gates were blocked from the outside with bags of firewood and straw before the flood arrived. (Jiang Yu Chi Ji) A long embankment was built against the city wall from within the city, strengthening its base. It was nine hundred and eighty-four zhang long, one zhang high, and twice as wide. (Jiang Yu Chi Ji)

The saying “water flows downwards” and water “takes the shape of its container” reflects the ancient understanding of the physical properties of water. Su Shi also recognized this. Therefore, before the flood arrived, he had the six culverts under the city wall blocked from the outside with bags of firewood and straw. “From the outside” is a very realistic detail. On the one hand, it shows that corresponding arrangements were made before the flood arrived, and these arrangements were thorough and comprehensive. On the other hand, when the city was besieged by floods, the water would exert pressure on the bags from the outside of the city wall towards the inside. Blocking the culverts from the outside was more effective than blocking them from the inside. In addition, for the flood control embankment, Su Shi not only increased its height to one zhang but also emphasized the reinforcement of the embankment’s cross-section to cope with the increased water pressure at the bottom of the city wall as the water level rose. This demonstrates Su Shi’s physical understanding of floods, which, from a methodological perspective, should belong to emergentism, deducing the characteristics of floods from the characteristics of water under normal circumstances.

Conscripting Troops Before the Disaster

Shi went to the Wuwei Camp and called out to the troop leader, “The river is about to endanger the city, the situation is urgent. Even though you are imperial troops, you must do your utmost for me.” The troop leader said, “Even the Prefect does not shy away from the mud and water, we commoners should offer our lives.” He led his men out with baskets and spades to build the southeast long dyke. It rained day and night, but the city did not sink more than three planks. Shi stayed in a hut on the dyke and did not enter his home. He had officials guard different sections, and thus the city was saved. (Song Shi·Su Shi Liezhuan)

From the analysis of the two points above, it can be seen that Su Shi had to mobilize as much manpower and material resources as possible to complete the project of “nine hundred and eighty-four zhang long, one zhang high, and twice as wide.” It is now speculated that the flood control works meeting the requirements could not have been completed by relying solely on the city’s residents. Thus, Su Shi went to the Wuwei Camp to appeal for the imperial troops to participate in the flood control mission. According to the military system of the Northern Song Dynasty, the imperial troops were under the direct command of the Northern Song Emperor, and Su Shi, as a local official, had no authority to deploy them. Regarding the Northern Song’s “personnel” principles, Su Shi decided to break the rules to solve the current problem, and the troop leader generously responded to the call. Su Shi’s ability to orderly dispatch officers and soldiers to block the flood in sections at the critical moment when the water was about to overflow, ultimately saving Xuzhou city, demonstrates his outstanding engineering management capabilities. Utilizing limited material and human resources to achieve predetermined engineering goals is itself a planning problem within “management.” Although there is no historical data showing Su Shi’s specific detailed arrangements for this, judging from the engineering volume of the dyke construction and the successful outcome of flood control, Su Shi successfully solved this planning problem.

Building a Large Dyke After the Disaster

Last year, I planned to build a stone embankment, costing more than 29,500 strings of cash… Although the cost was slightly high, it could ensure complete safety and a hundred years of benefit. Now it is already spring, and there is no news. Considering the time is pressing, it will be difficult to gather the resources… Now, after further consideration, I have decided to reduce it to a wooden embankment, and the construction cost is only halved… If this plan also fails, then the worries of our prefecture will be immeasurable. (Yu Liu Gongfu Si Shou Zhi Si) He again requested to mobilize laborers next year to reinforce the old city wall and build a wooden embankment to guard against the recurrence of floods. The imperial court approved it. (Song Shi·Su Shi Liezhuan)

After this flood, Su Shi was still worried that Xuzhou would experience another flood in the future, so he planned to build a large dyke for future flood control. At this time, the situation was not as urgent as when the disaster struck. Su Shi had the opportunity to fully investigate the terrain, plan the construction of the dyke, and choose strong and reliable stone materials for construction. This shows Su Shi’s understanding of physics: floods are likely to recur, and stone dykes can more effectively resist floods. However, perhaps due to the excessive cost, the central government did not respond. Su Shi then compromised, using cheaper wood, which was less reliable in the long term, to reduce construction costs, and finally managed to build the embankment. This also shows Su Shi’s understanding of management: under practical constraints, balancing performance and cost by changing materials and other methods.

Conclusion

Through the analysis of Su Shi’s Xuzhou flood control from beginning to end, it can be seen that Su Shi’s various arrangements and practices are highly consistent with current systems methodology. In terms of physics, Su Shi repaired and strengthened the city defenses in advance according to the characteristics of the flood, and after the disaster, he first considered using stone to build a large dyke to cope with possible future floods. In terms of management, Su Shi overstepped his authority to conscript troops before the disaster and reasonably arranged city defense tasks, and after the disaster, he comprehensively considered performance and cost to build a wooden embankment. In terms of humanity, Su Shi first suppressed the signs of unrest and appeased the people. In summary, Su Shi’s Xuzhou flood control is highly consistent with current systems methodology. The view that “the Physics-Management-Humanity methodology has traditional Chinese philosophical speculation” (Reference 3) is not without reason.

References

1. Dai Peichao. Research on the Changes of Xuzhou’s Water Environment and the Rise and Fall of the City in Historical Periods. (Jiangsu Normal University, 2014).
2. Qian Cheng & Han Baoping. Characteristics of Yellow River Floods in Xuzhou’s History and Their Impact on Regional Social Development. Journal of China University of Mining and Technology (Social Sciences Edition) 10, 114-118+131 (2008).
3. WSR Systems Methodology. Baidu Baike https://baike.baidu.com/item/WSR%E7%B3%BB%E7%BB%9F%E6%96%B9%E6%B3%95%E8%AE%BA/11038444?fr=aladdin.